Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1950
I have chosen this subject for my lecture
tonight because I think that most current discussions of politics and political
theory take insufficient account of psychology. Economic facts, population
statistics, constitutional organization, and so on, are set forth minutely.
There is no difficulty in finding out how many South Koreans and how many North
Koreans there were when the Korean War began. If you will look into the right
books you will be able to ascertain what was their average
income per head, and what were the sizes of their respective armies. But
if you want to know what sort of person a Korean is, and whether there is any
appreciable difference between a North Korean and a South Korean; if you wish
to know what they respectively want out of life, what are their discontents,
what their hopes and what their fears; in a word, what it is that, as they say,
«makes them tick», you will look through the reference books in vain. And so
you cannot tell whether the South Koreans are enthusiastic about UNO, or would prefer union with
their cousins in the North. Nor can you guess whether they are willing to forgo
land reform for the privilege of voting for some politician they have never
heard of. It is neglect of such questions by the eminent men who sit in remote capitals, that so frequently causes disappointment. If
politics is to become scientific, and if the event is not to be constantly
surprising, it is imperative that our political thinking should penetrate more
deeply into the springs of human action. What is the influence of hunger upon
slogans? How does their effectiveness fluctuate with the number of calories in
your diet? If one man offers you democracy and another offers you a bag of
grain, at what stage of starvation will you prefer the grain to the vote? Such
questions are far too little considered. However, let us, for the present,
forget the Koreans, and consider the human race.
All human activity is prompted by desire. There is a wholly fallacious theory
advanced by some earnest moralists to the effect that it is possible to resist
desire in the interests of duty and moral principle. I say this is fallacious,
not because no man ever acts from a sense of duty, but because duty has no hold
on him unless he desires to be dutiful. If you wish to know what men will do,
you must know not only, or principally, their material circumstances, but
rather the whole system of their desires with their relative strengths.
There are some desires which, though very powerful, have not, as a rule, any
great political importance. Most men at some period of their lives desire to
marry, but as a rule they can satisfy this desire without having to take any
political action. There are, of course, exceptions; the rape of the Sabine
women is a case in point. And the development of northern Australia is
seriously impeded by the fact that the vigorous young men who ought to do the
work dislike being wholly deprived of female society. But such cases are
unusual, and in general the interest that men and women take in each other has
little influence upon politics.
The desires that are politically important may be divided into a primary and a
secondary group. In the primary group come the necessities of life: food and shelter
and clothing. When these things become very scarce, there is no limit to the
efforts that men will make, or to the violence that they will display, in the
hope of securing them. It is said by students of the earliest history that, on
four separate occasions, drought in Arabia caused the population of that
country to overflow into surrounding regions, with immense effects, political,
cultural, and religious. The last of these four occasions was the rise of
Islam. The gradual spread of Germanic tribes from southern Russia to England,
and thence to San Francisco, had similar motives. Undoubtedly the desire for
food has been, and still is, one of the main causes of great political events.
But man differs from other animals in one very important respect, and that is
that he has some desires which are, so to speak, infinite, which can never be
fully gratified, and which would keep him restless even in Paradise. The boa
constrictor, when he has had an adequate meal, goes to sleep, and does not wake
until he needs another meal. Human beings, for the most part, are not like
this. When the Arabs, who had been used to living sparingly on a few dates,
acquired the riches of the Eastern Roman Empire, and dwelt in palaces of almost
unbelievable luxury, they did not, on that account, become inactive. Hunger
could no longer be a motive, for Greek slaves supplied them with exquisite
viands at the slightest nod. But other desires kept them active: four in
particular, which we can label acquisitiveness, rivalry, vanity, and love of
power.
Acquisitiveness - the wish to possess as much as possible of goods, or the
title to goods - is a motive which, I suppose, has its origin in a combination
of fear with the desire for necessaries. I once befriended two little girls
from Estonia, who had narrowly escaped death from starvation in a famine. They
lived in my family, and of course had plenty to eat. But they spent all their
leisure visiting neighbouring farms and stealing
potatoes, which they hoarded. Rockefeller, who in his infancy had experienced
great poverty, spent his adult life in a similar manner. Similarly the Arab
chieftains on their silken Byzantine divans could not forget the desert, and
hoarded riches far beyond any possible physical need. But whatever may be the psychoanalysis
of acquisitiveness, no one can deny that it is one of the great motives -
especially among the more powerful, for, as I said before, it is one of the
infinite motives. However much you may acquire, you will always wish to acquire
more; satiety is a dream which will always elude you.
But acquisitiveness, although it is the mainspring of the capitalist system, is
by no means the most powerful of the motives that survive the conquest of
hunger. Rivalry is a much stronger motive. Over and over again in Mohammedan
history, dynasties have come to grief because the sons of a sultan by different
mothers could not agree, and in the resulting civil war universal ruin
resulted. The same sort of thing happens in modern Europe. When the British
Government very unwisely allowed the Kaiser to be present at a naval review at
Spithead, the thought which arose in his mind was not the one which we had
intended. What he thought was, «I must have a Navy as good as Grandmamma's». And from this thought have sprung all our
subsequent troubles. The world would be a happier place than it is if
acquisitiveness were always stronger than rivalry. But in fact, a great many
men will cheerfully face impoverishment if they can thereby secure complete
ruin for their rivals. Hence the present level of taxation.
Vanity is a motive of immense potency. Anyone who has much to do with children
knows how they are constantly performing some antic, and saying «Look at me».
«Look at me» is one of the most fundamental desires of the human heart. It can
take innumerable forms, from buffoonery to the pursuit of posthumous fame.
There was a Renaissance Italian princeling who was asked by the priest on his
deathbed if he had anything to repent of. «Yes», he said, «there is one thing.
On one occasion I had a visit from the Emperor and the Pope simultaneously. I
took them to the top of my tower to see the view, and I neglected the
opportunity to throw them both down, which would have given me immortal fame».
History does not relate whether the priest gave him absolution. One of the
troubles about vanity is that it grows with what it feeds on. The more you are
talked about, the more you will wish to be talked about. The condemned murderer
who is allowed to see the account of his trial in the press is indignant if he
finds a newspaper which has reported it inadequately. And the more he finds
about himself in other newspapers, the more indignant he will be with the one
whose reports are meagre. Politicians and literary
men are in the same case. And the more famous they become, the more difficult
the press-cutting agency finds it to satisfy them. It is scarcely possible to
exaggerate the influence of vanity throughout the range of human life, from the
child of three to the potentate at whose frown the world trembles. Mankind have
even committed the impiety of attributing similar desires to the Deity, whom
they imagine avid for continual praise.
But great as is the influence of the motives we have been considering, there is
one which outweighs them all. I mean the love of power. Love of power is
closely akin to vanity, but it is not by any means the same thing. What vanity
needs for its satisfaction is glory, and it is easy to have glory without
power. The people who enjoy the greatest glory in the United States are film
stars, but they can be put in their place by the Committee for Un-American
Activities, which enjoys no glory whatever. In England, the King has more glory
than the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister has more power than the King.
Many people prefer glory to power, but on the whole these people have less
effect upon the course of events than those who prefer power to glory. When Blücher, in 1814, saw Napoleon's palaces, he said, «Wasn't
he a fool to have all this and to go running after Moscow.»
Napoleon, who certainly was not destitute of vanity, preferred power when he
had to choose. To Blücher, this choice seemed
foolish. Power, like vanity, is insatiable. Nothing short of omnipotence could
satisfy it completely. And as it is especially the vice of energetic men, the
causal efficacy of love of power is out of all proportion to its frequency. It
is, indeed, by far the strongest motive in the lives of important men.
Love of power is greatly increased by the experience of power, and this applies
to petty power as well as to that of potentates. In the happy days before 1914,
when well-to-do ladies could acquire a host of servants, their pleasure in
exercising power over the domestics steadily increased with age. Similarly, in
any autocratic regime, the holders of power become increasingly tyrannical with
experience of the delights that power can afford. Since power over human beings
is shown in making them do what they would rather not do, the man who is
actuated by love of power is more apt to inflict pain than to permit pleasure.
If you ask your boss for leave of absence from the office on some legitimate
occasion, his love of power will derive more satisfaction from a refusal than
from a consent. If you require a building permit, the
petty official concerned will obviously get more pleasure from saying «No» than
from saying «Yes». It is this sort of thing which makes the love of power such
a dangerous motive.
But it has other sides which are more desirable. The pursuit of knowledge is, I
think, mainly actuated by love of power. And so are all advances in scientific
technique. In politics, also, a reformer may have just as strong a love of
power as a despot. It would be a complete mistake to decry love of power
altogether as a motive. Whether you will be led by this motive to actions which
are useful, or to actions which are pernicious, depends upon the social system,
and upon your capacities. If your capacities are theoretical or technical, you
will contribute to knowledge or technique, and, as a rule, your activity will
be useful. If you are a politician you may be actuated by love of power, but as
a rule this motive will join itself on to the desire to see some state of
affairs realized which, for some reason, you prefer to the status quo. A great
general may, like Alcibiades, be quite indifferent as to which side he fights
on, but most generals have preferred to fight for their own country, and have,
therefore, had other motives besides love of power. The politician may change
sides so frequently as to find himself always in the majority, but most
politicians have a preference for one party to the other, and subordinate their
love of power to this preference. Love of power as nearly pure as possible is
to be seen in various different types of men. One type is the soldier of
fortune, of whom Napoleon is the supreme example. Napoleon had, I think, no
ideological preference for France over Corsica, but if he had become Emperor of
Corsica he would not have been so great a man as he became by pretending to be
a Frenchman. Such men, however, are not quite pure examples, since they also
derive immense satisfaction from vanity. The purest type is that of the eminence
grise - the power behind the throne that never
appears in public, and merely hugs itself with the secret thought: «How little
these puppets know who is pulling the strings.» Baron
Holstein, who controlled the foreign policy of the German Empire from 1890 to
1906, illustrates this type to perfection. He lived in a slum; he never
appeared in society; he avoided meeting the Emperor, except on one single
occasion when the Emperor's importunity could not be resisted; he refused all
invitations to Court functions, on the ground that he possessed no court dress.
He had acquired secrets which enabled him to blackmail the Chancellor and many
of the Kaiser's intimates. He used the power of blackmail, not to acquire
wealth, or fame, or any other obvious advantage, but merely to compel the
adoption of the foreign policy he preferred. In the East, similar characters
were not very uncommon among eunuchs.
I come now to other motives which, though in a sense less fundamental than
those we have been considering, are still of considerable importance. The first
of these is love of excitement. Human beings show their superiority to the
brutes by their capacity for boredom, though I have sometimes thought, in
examining the apes at the zoo, that they, perhaps, have the rudiments of this
tiresome emotion. However that may be, experience shows that escape from boredom
is one of the really powerful desires of almost all human beings. When white
men first effect contact with some unspoilt
race of savages, they offer them all kinds of benefits, from the light of the
gospel to pumpkin pie. These, however, much as we may regret it, most savages
receive with indifference. What they really value among the gifts that we bring
to them is intoxicating liquor which enables them, for the first time in their
lives, to have the illusion for a few brief moments that it is better to be
alive than dead. Red Indians, while they were still unaffected by white men,
would smoke their pipes, not calmly as we do, but orgiastically,
inhaling so deeply that they sank into a faint. And when excitement by means of
nicotine failed, a patriotic orator would stir them up to attack a neighbouring tribe, which would give them all the enjoyment
that we (according to our temperament) derive from a horse race or a General
Election. The pleasure of gambling consists almost entirely in excitement.
Monsieur Huc describes Chinese traders at the Great
Wall in winter, gambling until they have lost all their cash, then proceeding
to lose all their merchandise, and at last gambling away their clothes and
going out naked to die of cold. With civilized men, as with primitive Red
Indian tribes, it is, I think, chiefly love of excitement which makes the populace applaud when war breaks out; the emotion is exactly
the same as at a football match, although the results are sometimes somewhat
more serious.
It is not altogether easy to decide what is the root cause of
the love of excitement. I incline to think that our mental make-up is
adapted to the stage when men lived by hunting. When a man spent a long day
with very primitive weapons in stalking a deer with the hope of dinner, and
when, at the end of the day, he dragged the carcass triumphantly to his cave,
he sank down in contented weariness, while his wife dressed and cooked the
meat. He was sleepy, and his bones ached, and the smell of cooking filled every
nook and cranny of his consciousness. At last, after eating, he sank into deep
sleep. In such a life there was neither time nor energy for boredom. But when
he took to agriculture, and made his wife do all the heavy work in the fields,
he had time to reflect upon the vanity of human life, to invent mythologies and
systems of philosophy, and to dream of the life hereafter in which he would
perpetually hunt the wild boar of Valhalla. Our mental make-up is suited to a
life of very severe physical labor. I used, when I was younger, to take my
holidays walking. I would cover twenty-five miles a day, and when the evening
came I had no need of anything to keep me from boredom, since the delight of
sitting amply sufficed. But modern life cannot be conducted on these physically
strenuous principles. A great deal of work is sedentary, and most manual work
exercises only a few specialized muscles. When crowds assemble in Trafalgar
Square to cheer to the echo an announcement that the government has decided to
have them killed, they would not do so if they had all walked twenty-five miles
that day. This cure for bellicosity is, however, impracticable, and if the
human race is to survive - a thing which is, perhaps, undesirable - other means
must be found for securing an innocent outlet for the unused physical energy
that produces love of excitement. This is a matter which has been too little
considered, both by moralists and by social reformers. The social reformers are
of the opinion that they have more serious things to consider. The moralists,
on the other hand, are immensely impressed with the seriousness of all the
permitted outlets of the love of excitement; the seriousness, however, in their
minds, is that of Sin. Dance halls, cinemas, this age of jazz, are all, if we
may believe our ears, gateways to Hell, and we should be better employed
sitting at home contemplating our sins. I find myself unable to be in entire
agreement with the grave men who utter these warnings. The devil has many
forms, some designed to deceive the young, some
designed to deceive the old and serious. If it is the devil
that tempts the young to enjoy themselves, is it not, perhaps, the same
personage that persuades the old to condemn their enjoyment? And is not
condemnation perhaps merely a form of excitement appropriate to old age? And is
it not, perhaps, a drug which - like opium - has to be taken in continually
stronger doses to produce the desired effect? Is it not to be feared that,
beginning with the wickedness of the cinema, we should be led step by step to
condemn the opposite political party, dagoes, wops, Asiatics,
and, in short, everybody except the fellow members of our club? And it is from
just such condemnations, when widespread, that wars proceed. I have never heard
of a war that proceeded from dance halls.
What is serious about excitement is that so many of its forms are destructive.
It is destructive in those who cannot resist excess in alcohol or gambling. It
is destructive when it takes the form of mob violence. And above all it is destructive
when it leads to war. It is so deep a need that it will find harmful outlets of
this kind unless innocent outlets are at hand. There are such innocent outlets
at present in sport, and in politics so long as it is kept within
constitutional bounds. But these are not sufficient, especially as the kind of
politics that is most exciting is also the kind that does most harm. Civilized
life has grown altogether too tame, and, if it is to be stable, it must provide
harmless outlets for the impulses which our remote ancestors satisfied in
hunting. In Australia, where people are few and rabbits are many, I watched a
whole populace satisfying the primitive impulse in the primitive manner by the
skillful slaughter of many thousands of rabbits. But in London or New York,
where people are many and rabbits are few, some other means must be found to
gratify primitive impulse. I think every big town should contain artificial
waterfalls that people could descend in very fragile canoes, and they should
contain bathing pools full of mechanical sharks. Any person found advocating a
preventive war should be condemned to two hours a day with these ingenious
monsters. More seriously, pains should be taken to provide constructive outlets
for the love of excitement. Nothing in the world is more exciting than a moment
of sudden discovery or invention, and many more people are capable of
experiencing such moments than is sometimes thought.
Interwoven with many other political motives are two closely related passions
to which human beings are regrettably prone: I mean fear and hate. It is normal
to hate what we fear, and it happens frequently, though not always, that we
fear what we hate. I think it may be taken as the rule among primitive men,
that they both fear and hate whatever is unfamiliar. They have their own herd,
originally a very small one. And within one herd, all are friends, unless there
is some special ground of enmity. Other herds are potential or actual enemies;
a single member of one of them who strays by accident will be killed. An alien
herd as a whole will be avoided or fought according to circumstances. It is
this primitive mechanism which still controls our instinctive reaction to
foreign nations. The completely untravelled person
will view all foreigners as the savage regards a member of another herd. But
the man who has travelled, or who has studied international politics, will have
discovered that, if his herd is to prosper, it must, to some degree, become
amalgamated with other herds. If you are English and someone says to you, «The
French are your brothers», your first instinctive feeling will be, «Nonsense.
They shrug their shoulders, and talk French. And I am even told that they eat
frogs.» If he explains to you that we may have to
fight the Russians, that, if so, it will be desirable to defend the line of the
Rhine, and that, if the line of the Rhine is to be defended, the help of the
French is essential, you will begin to see what he means when he says that the
French are your brothers. But if some fellow-traveller
were to go on to say that the Russians also are your brothers, he would be
unable to persuade you, unless he could show that we are in danger from the
Martians. We love those who hate our enemies, and if we had no enemies there
would be very few people whom we should love.
All this, however, is only true so long as we are concerned solely with
attitudes towards other human beings. You might regard the soil as your enemy
because it yields reluctantly a niggardly subsistence. You might regard Mother
Nature in general as your enemy, and envisage human life as a struggle to get
the better of Mother Nature. If men viewed life in this way, cooperation of the
whole human race would become easy. And men could easily be brought to view
life in this way if schools, newspapers, and politicians devoted themselves to
this end. But schools are out to teach patriotism; newspapers are out to stir
up excitement; and politicians are out to get re-elected. None of the three,
therefore, can do anything towards saving the human race from reciprocal
suicide.
There are two ways of coping with fear: one is to diminish the external danger,
and the other is to cultivate Stoic endurance. The latter can be reinforced,
except where immediate action is necessary, by turning our thoughts away from
the cause of fear. The conquest of fear is of very great importance. Fear is in
itself degrading; it easily becomes an obsession; it produces hate of that
which is feared, and it leads headlong to excesses of cruelty. Nothing has so
beneficent an effect on human beings as security. If an international system
could be established which would remove the fear of war, the improvement in
everyday mentality of everyday people would be enormous and very rapid. Fear,
at present, overshadows the world. The atom bomb and the bacterial bomb,
wielded by the wicked communist or the wicked capitalist as the case may be,
make Washington and the Kremlin tremble, and drive men further along the road
toward the abyss. If matters are to improve, the first and essential step is to
find a way of diminishing fear. The world at present is obsessed by the
conflict of rival ideologies, and one of the apparent causes of conflict is the
desire for the victory of our own ideology and the defeat of the other. I do
not think that the fundamental motive here has much to do with ideologies. I
think the ideologies are merely a way of grouping people, and that the passions
involved are merely those which always arise between rival groups. There are,
of course, various reasons for hating communists. First and foremost, we
believe that they wish to take away our property. But so do burglars, and
although we disapprove of burglars our attitude towards them is very different
indeed from our attitude towards communists - chiefly because they do not
inspire the same degree of fear. Secondly, we hate the communists because they
are irreligious. But the Chinese have been irreligious since the eleventh
century, and we only began to hate them when they turned out Chiang Kai-shek.
Thirdly, we hate the communists because they do not believe in democracy, but
we consider this no reason for hating Franco. Fourthly, we hate them because
they do not allow liberty; this we feel so strongly that we have decided to
imitate them. It is obvious that none of these is the real ground for our
hatred. We hate them because we fear them and they threaten us. If the Russians
still adhered to the Greek Orthodox religion, if they had instituted
parliamentary government, and if they had a completely free press which daily
vituperated us, then - provided they still had armed forces as powerful as they
have now - we should still hate them if they gave us ground for thinking them
hostile. There is, of course, the odium theologicum,
and it can be a cause of enmity. But I think that this is an offshoot of herd
feeling: the man who has a different theology feels strange, and whatever is
strange must be dangerous. Ideologies, in fact, are one of the methods by which
herds are created, and the psychology is much the same however the herd may
have been generated.
You may have been feeling that I have allowed only for bad motives, or, at
best, such as are ethically neutral. I am afraid they are, as a rule, more
powerful than more altruistic motives, but I do not deny that altruistic
motives exist, and may, on occasion, be effective. The agitation against
slavery in England in the early nineteenth century was indubitably altruistic,
and was thoroughly effective. Its altruism was proved by the fact that in 1833
British taxpayers paid many millions in compensation to Jamaican landowners for
the liberation of their slaves, and also by the fact that at the Congress of
Vienna the British Government was prepared to make important concessions with a
view to inducing other nations to abandon the slave trade. This is an instance
from the past, but present-day America has afforded instances equally
remarkable. I will not, however, go into these, as I do not wish to become
embarked in current controversies.
I do not think it can be questioned that sympathy is a genuine motive, and that
some people at some times are made somewhat uncomfortable by the sufferings of
some other people. It is sympathy that has produced the many humanitarian
advances of the last hundred years. We are shocked when we hear stories of the
ill-treatment of lunatics, and there are now quite a number of asylums in which
they are not ill-treated. Prisoners in Western countries are not supposed to be
tortured, and when they are, there is an outcry if the facts are discovered. We
do not approve of treating orphans as they are treated in Oliver Twist.
Protestant countries disapprove of cruelty to animals. In all these ways
sympathy has been politically effective. If the fear of war were removed, its
effectiveness would become much greater. Perhaps the best hope for the future
of mankind is that ways will be found of increasing the scope and intensity of
sympathy.
The time has come to sum up our discussion. Politics is concerned with herds
rather than with individuals, and the passions which are important in politics
are, therefore, those in which the various members of a given herd can feel
alike. The broad instinctive mechanism upon which political edifices have to be
built is one of cooperation within the herd and hostility towards other herds.
The co-operation within the herd is never perfect. There are members who do not
conform, who are, in the etymological sense, «egregious», that is to say,
outside the flock. These members are those who have fallen below, or risen
above, the ordinary level. They are: idiots, criminals, prophets, and
discoverers. A wise herd will learn to tolerate the eccentricity of those who
rise above the average, and to treat with a minimum of ferocity those who fall
below it.
As regards relations to other herds, modern technique has produced a conflict
between self-interest and instinct. In old days, when two tribes went to war,
one of them exterminated the other, and annexed its territory. From the point
of view of the victor, the whole operation was thoroughly satisfactory. The
killing was not at all expensive, and the excitement was agreeable. It is not
to be wondered at that, in such circumstances, war persisted. Unfortunately, we
still have the emotions appropriate to such primitive warfare, while the actual
operations of war have changed completely. Killing an enemy in a modern war is
a very expensive operation. If you consider how many Germans were killed in the
late war, and how much the victors are paying in income tax, you can, by a sum
in long division, discover the cost of a dead German, and you will find it
considerable. In the East, it is true, the enemies of
the Germans have secured the ancient advantages of turning out the defeated
population and occupying their lands. The Western victors, however, have
secured no such advantages. It is obvious that modern war is not good business
from a financial point of view. Although we won both the world wars, we should
now be much richer if they had not occured. If men
were actuated by self-interest, which they are not - except in the case of a
few saints - the whole human race would cooperate. There would be no more wars,
no more armies, no more navies, no more atom bombs.
There would not be armies of propagandists employed in poisoning the minds of
Nation A against Nation B, and reciprocally of Nation B against Nation A. There
would not be armies of officials at frontiers to prevent the entry of foreign
books and foreign ideas, however excellent in themselves. There would not be customs
barriers to ensure the existence of many small enterprises where one big
enterprise would be more economic. All this would happen very quickly if men
desired their own happiness as ardently as they desired the misery of their neighbours. But, you will tell me, what is the use of these
utopian dreams ? Moralists will see to it that we do
not become wholly selfish, and until we do the millenium
will be impossible.
I do not wish to seem to end upon a note of cynicism. I do not deny that there
are better things than selfishness, and that some people achieve these things.
I maintain, however, on the one hand, that there are few occasions upon which
large bodies of men, such as politics is concerned with, can rise above
selfishness, while, on the other hand, there are a very great many
circumstances in which populations will fall below selfishness, if selfishness
is interpreted as enlightened self-interest.
And among those occasions on which people fall below self-interest are most of
the occasions on which they are convinced that they are acting from idealistic
motives. Much that passes as idealism is disguised hatred or disguised love of
power. When you see large masses of men swayed by what appear to be noble
motives, it is as well to look below the surface and ask yourself what it is
that makes these motives effective. It is partly because it is so easy to be
taken in by a facade of nobility that a psychological inquiry, such as I have
been attempting, is worth making. I would say, in conclusion, that if what I
have said is right, the main thing needed to make the world happy is
intelligence. And this, after all, is an optimistic conclusion, because
intelligence is a thing that can be fostered by known methods of education.
From Nobel
Lectures, Literature 1901-1967.